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Objectivity	in	contexts	
Withholding	epistemic	judgement	as	a	strategy	for	mitigating	collective	
bias	Inkeri	Koskinen		
Abstract:	In	this	paper	I	discuss	and	develop	the	risk	account	of	scientific	objectivity,	which	I	
have	recently	introduced,	contrasting	it	to	some	alternatives.	I	then	use	the	account	in	order	to	
analyse	a	practice	that	is	relatively	common	in	anthropology,	in	the	history	of	science,	and	in	the	
sociology	of	scientific	knowledge:	withholding	epistemic	judgement.	I	argue	that	withholding	
epistemic	judgement	on	the	beliefs	one	is	studying	can	be	a	relatively	efficient	strategy	against	
collective	bias	in	these	fields.	However,	taking	into	account	the	criticisms	presented	against	the	
strategy,	I	also	argue	that	it	is	a	usable	strategy	only	when	the	distance	between	the	researchers	
and	their	ideas,	and	the	people	and	ideas	being	studied,	is	significant	enough.		Keywords:	scientific	objectivity,	epistemic	risk,	values	in	science,	collective	bias,	objectivity	in	the	social	sciences,	objectivity	in	the	humanities		
1.	Introduction	Much	of	the	philosophical	literature	on	scientific	objectivity	is	based	on	the	dismissal	of	one	or	another	of	two	important	accounts	of	objectivity.	According	to	the	first,	scientific	knowledge	is	objective	when	it	grasps	the	objects	as	they	really	are,	independently	of	us.	The	second	identifies	scientific	objectivity	with	the	absence	of	non-epistemic	values	at	the	central	stages	of	scientific	knowledge	production.	Both	accounts	have	been	thoroughly	criticised.	However,	abandoning	them	has	left	us	with	a	plethora	of	different,	conceptually	distinct	notions	of	objectivity,	each	of	which	seems	to	have	normative	force	and	be	useful	in	some	context	–	and	without	a	satisfactory	way	to	explain	why	they	all	are	notions	of	objectivity.	After	Heather	Douglas’s	influential	analysis	of	the	situation	(2004;	2009),	many	philosophers	of	science	have	agreed	that	instead	of	attempting	to	develop	a	single,	coherent	philosophical	account	of	scientific	objectivity,	we	should	either	focus	on	distinguishing	different,	context-sensitive	notions	of	objectivity,	or	as	Ian	Hacking	(2015),	for	instance,	has	suggested,	renounce	the	whole	notion.		However,	as	I	have	recently	argued	(Koskinen	2018),	the	diverse	context-sensitive,	"applicable"	senses	of	objectivity	recognised	in	the	recent	literature	can	be	covered	with	a	single,	essentially	descriptive	account:	when	we	call	something	objective,	we	say	that	we	rely	on	it,	and	that	others	can	safely	do	so	too,	because	important	epistemic	risks	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents	have	been	effectively	mitigated	or	averted.	All	the	senses	of	
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objectivity	discussed	in	the	recent	literature	identify	either	some	risk	of	this	type,	or	some	efficient	strategy	for	averting	or	mitigating	one	or	more	such	risks.		This	"risk	account"	represents	objectivity	as	a	contextual	matter:	our	diverse	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents	lead	to	diverse	epistemic	risks,	some	of	which	become	important	in	some	contexts,	and	other	ones	in	others.	Moreover,	the	risk	mitigation	strategies	we	use	must	also	vary	according	to	context,	as	not	all	strategies	are	efficient	everywhere.	As	the	editors	of	this	topical	collection	have	noted,	not	much	attention	has	yet	been	paid	to	social	research	in	the	recent	literature	on	objectivity	in	science.	So	in	this	paper	I	focus	on	a	certain	strategy	developed	and	used	in	the	humanities	and	qualitative	social	sciences,	contrasting	it	to	strategies	developed	in	the	natural	sciences.	As	Daston	and	Galison	(2007)	note,	objectivity	has	historically	been	strongly	linked	to	the	duty	of	scientists	to	avoid	subjectivity.	Strategies	developed	with	this	aim	in	mind	typically	screen	out	the	subjective	biases	and	idiosyncrasies	of	individual	researchers.	However,	such	strategies	are	not	efficient	against	collective	bias	–	that	is,	situations	where	an	entire	research	community	shares	some	biased	view,	possibly	without	anyone	realising	the	situation.	I	will	argue	that	the	strategy	of	withholding	epistemic	judgement	has	been	adopted	in	anthropology,	in	the	sociology	of	scientific	knowledge,	and	in	the	history	of	science,	in	order	to	mitigate	ethnocentrism,	Whig	historiography,	and	asymmetrical	explanations	of	successful	and	unsuccessful	scientific	theories	–	all	perceived	as	collective	biases.	The	strategy	of	withholding	epistemic	judgement	reflects	the	perceived	importance	of	averting	or	mitigating	collective	bias	in	the	humanities	and	qualitative	social	sciences.	But	the	contextual	nature	of	risk	mitigation	strategies	means	that	a	strategy	that	is	satisfactory	in	one	context	can	be	less	satisfactory	in	another	one,	or	can	become	unusable	when	the	context	changes.	I	analyse	arguments	presented	against	the	practice	of	withholding	epistemic	judgement	in	the	light	of	the	risk	account	of	scientific	objectivity.	I	will	begin	with	an	overview	of	the	recent	literature	on	scientific	objectivity,	and	identify	four	desiderata	for	an	applicable	account	of	objectivity.	Then	I	discuss	positive	and	negative	accounts	of	objectivity,	and	present	and	defend	the	risk	account	of	scientific	objectivity.	Finally	I	use	it	to	analyse	the	practice	of	withholding	epistemic	judgement	as	a	strategy	for	mitigating	collective	bias	in	anthropology,	history	of	science	and	the	sociology	of	scientific	knowledge.		
2.	Applicable	senses	of	scientific	objectivity	Let	me	start	from	two	distinct,	influential	understandings	of	scientific	objectivity:	objectivity	as	grasping	the	objects,	and	objectivity	as	value-freedom.	According	to	the	first	view,	objectivity	has	an	ontological	and	an	epistemic	aspect:	objective	knowledge	tells	about	things	as	they	are	out	there	in	the	world,	independent	of	us	(Axtell	2016;	Reiss	and	Sprenger	2017).	This	view	has	been	thoroughly	criticised.	For	Kantian	reasons	one	might	say	that	it	does	not	even	make	sense,	as	we	have	no	conceptual	access	to	things	except	under	one	or	another	representation	–	that	is,	we	have	no	access	to	things	as	they	are	completely	independent	of	us.	Or	one	might	adopt	a	Foucauldian	argument	and	point	out	that	many	knowledge	claims	that	
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are	taken	as	objective	have	meaning	only	in	complex	and	questionable	networks	of	social	and	ethical	commitments,	and	that	this	destabilises	the	idea	of	their	objectivity	in	such	a	strong	sense.	Or	one	might	simply	note	that	this	understanding	of	scientific	objectivity	seems	to	presuppose	a	view	from	nowhere	(Nagel	1986),	which	we	do	not	have,	or	point	to	the	"Really	Real"	(Lloyd	1995),	which	we	cannot	reach.	But	much	recent	discussion	about	scientific	objectivity	has	arisen	from	criticisms	of	the	other	influential	account	of	objectivity:	the	value-free	ideal,	or	in	other	words,	the	idea	that	in	objective	research,	non-epistemic	values	do	not	influence	the	gathering	of	evidence	or	the	acceptance	of	scientific	theories.	This	account	makes	no	references	to	the	objects	as	they	are	independently	of	us,	but	it	has	nevertheless	been	denounced	as	unattainable,	as	we	cannot	ensure	that	the	value-freedom	of	all	the	background	assumptions	on	which	scientists	base	their	work	(Longino	1990;	2001).	Moreover,	many	philosophers	today	agree	that	non-epistemic	value	judgements	can	be	necessary	in	all	stages	of	scientific	knowledge	production	(Dupré	and	Wylie	2007;	Douglas	2000;	2009;	Crasnow	2013).		As	we	really	cannot	ensure	that	scientific	research	or	the	knowledge	it	produces	is	objective	in	either	of	these	two	senses,	and	as	we	do	not	necessarily	even	wish	them	to	be	so,	the	notion	of	objectivity	easily	becomes	just	a	rhetorical	device.	And	indeed,	precisely	for	this	reason	several	philosophers,	most	recently	Ian	Hacking	(2015),	have	suggested	that	philosophers	should	just	drop	the	whole	notion	from	their	conceptual	toolbox.	It	is	but	an	elevator	word	used	for	emphasis;	hand	waving	rather	than	a	useful	tool	for	philosophical	purposes.	However,	many	philosophers	still	want	to	defend	the	notion	as	a	useful	one	in	philosophy.	To	do	so,	they	(or	rather,	we)	have	developed	accounts	of	objectivity	that	I	call	"applicable":	ones	that	can	actually	be	applied	when	trying	to	assess	whether	something	–	a	method,	a	researcher,	a	community,	etc.	–	is	objective.	Clearly	the	first	of	the	two	accounts	described	above	is	inapplicable;	that	is	after	all	the	crux	of	many	of	the	criticisms	against	it.	Therefore	philosophers	of	science	who	wish	to	talk	about	scientific	objectivity	have	largely	adopted	a	different	approach:	they	do	not	mention	the	ontological	aspect	of	the	notion	at	all.	The	second	account	has	not	been	abandoned	so	thoroughly:	while	the	value-free	ideal	has	been	largely	abandoned,	controlling	the	role	of	non-epistemic	values	in	science	is	still	an	important	part	of	the	discussions	about	objectivity.	The	emphasis	on	applicability	has	led	to	discussions	about	objectivity	in	different	contexts.	What	makes	research	objective	in	fields	that	use	statistical	techniques	differs	from	what	makes	archaeological	collaborations	with	descendant	communities	objective,	or	what	makes	the	science	of	well-being	objective	(Freese	and	Peterson	2018;	Wylie	2015;	Alexandrova	2018).	It	seems	that	an	applicable	account	of	scientific	objectivity	has	to	be	somehow	contextual.	While	reading	recent	discussions	(e.g.	Montuschi	2003;	Douglas	2004;	2009;	Crasnow	2013;	Wright	2018;	see	also	Koskinen	2018),	I	have	outlined	four	desiderata	that	philosophers	trying	to	defend	some	applicable	notion	of	objectivity	appear	to	largely	share.	They	characterise	a	satisfactory	applicable	account	of	scientific	objectivity:	1. An	account	of	scientific	objectivity	should	not	refer	to	things	as	they	are	independent	of	us,	as	it	would	render	the	notion	inapplicable.	
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2. An	account	of	scientific	objectivity	should	allow	for	fallibilism:	objectivity	cannot	imply	certainty,	as	we	cannot	ensure	certainty	in	science.	3. In	order	to	be	an	applicable	notion,	scientific	objectivity	must	be	a	degree	notion:	we	have	to	be	able	to	say	that	y	increases	or	decreases	the	objectivity	of	X	(a	theory,	a	community,	a	procedure,	etc.).	4. A	satisfactory	account	of	scientific	objectivity	has	to	be	applicable	in	various	contexts:	it	should	be	of	use	when	talking	about	objectivity	both	for	instance	in	the	context	of	the	replication	crisis	in	the	experimental	sciences,	and	in	the	context	of	participatory	ethnography.	As	Heather	Douglas	(2004;	2009)	and	Marianne	Janack	(2002)	have	noted,	we	can	identify	several	senses	of	objectivity	that	are	used	in	the	philosophical	literature.	Many	of	them	are	"applicable"	in	the	sense	described	above.	For	instance,	procedural	objectivity,	where	the	research	process	has	been	designed	so	that	a	researcher	can	always	be	changed	to	another,	and	that	will	not	change	the	result,	meets	the	first	three	desiderata	fairly	well.	So	does	interactive	objectivity,	where	a	research	community	follows	practices	that	ensure	effective	critical	discussions	and	debates.	(Douglas	2004;	2009.)	And	as	philosophers	of	science	examine	applicable	criteria	for	assessing	the	objectivity	of	something	in	specific	contexts,	even	more	senses	of	objectivity	seem	to	emerge.	The	fourth	criterion	is	met	when	we	take	all	the	different	senses	into	account:	for	all	different	contexts,	there	are	typically	several	senses	of	objectivity	that	can	be	fruitfully	applied.	According	to	Douglas,	many	of	the	different	senses	of	objectivity	recognised	in	the	recent	literature	are	conceptually	distinct.	They	cannot	be	reduced	to	any	one	sense	"unless	one	is	willing	to	make	rather	strong	metaphysical	or	epistemological	presumptions"	(Douglas	2004,	465).	In	other	words,	unless	one	resorts	to	references	to	the	objects	as	they	are	independently	of	us,	or	something	similar	–	which	everyone	is	trying	to	avoid.	So	it	seems	that	if	we	give	up	the	ontological	aspect	of	objectivity,	the	notion	loses	an	important	cohesive	element,	and	we	end	up	with	a	plethora	of	different	senses	of	objectivity.	However,	I	have	recently	developed	a	descriptive	account	that	accounts	for	all	the	recognised	applicable	senses	of	objectivity,	and	thus	brings	some	unity	to	the	notion.	Before	describing	it	in	detail,	I	will	first	discuss	two	possible	approaches	towards	such	a	unifying	account.			
3.	Positive	and	negative	accounts		Let	us	distinguish	between	positive	accounts	of	objectivity	that	refer	to	some	epistemically	advantageous	elements	that	the	things	we	call	objective	share,	and	negative	accounts	that	focus	on	epistemically	harmful	elements	that	are	missing	from	whatever	we	call	objective.	Some	of	the	different	applicable	senses	of	objectivity	mentioned	above	are	positive,	and	some	negative.	Now,	if	we	are	looking	for	a	unifying	account	that	would	cover	all	these	different	applicable	senses,	should	we	look	for	a	positive	or	a	negative	account?	I	will	be	defending	a	negative	account.	To	clarify	why,	let	us	examine	a	positive	alternative.	In	this	topical	collection	Julie	Zahle	(forthcoming)	uses	a	positive	account	that	is	meant	to	grasp	the	many	different	ways	in	which	we	in	different	contexts	use	the	notion	of	objectivity.	She	
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refers	to	Thomas	Kuhn's	(1977)	classic	discussion	of	epistemic	values	and	Alison	Wylie's	description	of	objectivity	as	"a	loosely	defined	family	of	epistemic	virtues	that	we	expect	will	be	maximized,	in	some	combination,	by	the	claims	we	authorize	as	knowledge"	(Wylie	2003,	33).	When	focusing	on	the	objectivity	of	scientific	theories,	such	virtues	include	for	instance	empirical	adequacy,	internal	coherence,	and	inferential	robustness.	Wylie	emphasises	the	contextual	nature	of	objectivity	by	pointing	out	that	all	the	different	objectivity-making	properties	cannot	be	maximized	simultaneously.	So	the	choice	of	the	virtues	that	should	be	emphasised	depends	on	the	aims	and	purpose	of	the	conducted	research	–	which	in	turn	depend	both	on	value-decisions	and	on	the	context	in	question.		Zahle	applies	Wylie's	positive	account	and	develops	a	list	of	the	epistemically	good-making	features	of	qualitative	data	sets.	She	argues	that	descriptive	adequacy,	reactivity	transparency,	deception	transparency,	relevance,	balance,	and	sufficiency	make	qualitative	data	sets	objective.	These	features	are	"objectivity-making	characteristics";	they	constitute	the	objectivity	of	an	objective	data	set.	This	kind	of	a	positive	account	explains	well	why	objectivity	takes	different	forms	in	different	contexts:	all	of	the	different	objectivity-making	properties	cannot	be	maximized	simultaneously,	and	in	different	contexts	different	features	are	deemed	the	most	important	ones.	However,	such	a	positive	approach	faces	certain	problems.	It	risks	broadening	the	meaning	of	the	notion	so	far	that	it	no	longer	corresponds	with	our	actual	usage	of	it,	and	simultaneously	rendering	the	notion	superfluous.	This	is	because	it	risks	identifying	scientific	objectivity	with	anything	epistemically	advantageous.		For	instance,	if	we	were	assessing	the	objectivity	of	research	processes,	we	might	conclude	that	is	an	epistemically	good-making	feature	to	take	all	available,	relevant	data	into	account.	Surely	such	thoroughness	should	be	on	the	open-ended	list	of	epistemic	virtues	or	features	we	expect	to	be	maximized.	However,	if	a	researcher	for	some	reason	does	not	take	all	of	the	available,	relevant	data	into	account,	we	will	not	automatically	take	the	omission	as	a	sign	of	a	lack	of	objectivity.	There	are	other	possible	reasons	for	the	lapse,	such	as	ignorance.	If	the	researcher	is	told	about	the	missing	data,	and	she	then	promptly	takes	into	account,	it	would	seem	odd	to	claim	that	what	was	wrong	in	the	research	process	was	related	to	objectivity.	So	the	positive	account	broadens	the	notion	too	far:	we	use	the	notion	of	objectivity	only	in	some	of	the	situations	it	covers.	Moreover,	if	objectivity	is	identified	with	any	epistemically	good-making	features,	it	is	difficult	to	defend	the	continued	use	of	the	notion.	Why	not	just	dismiss	it,	as	Hacking	among	others	suggests,	and	simply	talk	about	epistemically	advantageous	features	of	research,	or	theories,	or	qualitative	data	sets	–	features	that	make	them	good?	If	we	are	to	defend	the	continued	use	of	the	notion	of	objectivity,	we	need	an	account	that	restricts	its	meaning	more	than	this	kind	of	a	positive	account	does.		The	other	possible	way	to	approach	the	issue,	that	is,	negative	accounts	of	objectivity,	seems	to	offer	the	needed	restrictions.	A	well-known	example	of	a	negative	account	has	been	presented	by	Lorraine	Daston	and	Peter	Galison	(2007).	They	argue	that	new	senses	of	objectivity	that	have	emerged	in	science	have	generally	been	related	to	newly	recognised	threats	arising	from	our	subjectivity:	objective	research	avoids	them.	Along	similar	lines,	Hacking	(2015)	has	recently	claimed	that	"objective"	is	a	negative	adjective	that	indicates	the	
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absence	of	some	epistemic	vice,	not	the	presence	of	an	epistemic	virtue.	However,	it	would	be	odd	to	call	collective	biases	of	which	researchers	are	unaware	"vices",	for	example.	So	I	would	like	to	talk	simply	of	threats	–	or	rather	risks.			
4.	The	risk	account	of	scientific	objectivity	I	have	recently	(Koskinen	2018)	defended	a	negative	account	that	I	call	the	risk	account	of	scientific	objectivity:	When	we	call	X	objective,	we	say	that	we	rely	on	X,	and	that	others	can	safely	do	so	too,	because	we	believe	that	important	epistemic	risks	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents	have	been	effectively	mitigated	or	averted.1	This	account	brings	unity	to	the	notion:	all	the	applicable	senses	of	objectivity	identify	either	an	epistemic	risk	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents,	or	a	strategy	for	mitigating	or	averting	one	or	several	such	risks.		The	risk	account	brings	together	several	ideas	developed	in	the	literature	on	objectivity.	Douglas	(2004,	2009),	following	Arthur	Fine	(1998),	argues	that	though	all	the	different	senses	of	objectivity	are	conceptually	distinct,	they	do	have	something	in	common:	when	we	call	X	objective,	we	say	that	we	trust	X,	and	that	others	should	do	so	too	–	objectivity	indicates	"a	shared	basis	for	trust	in	a	claim"	(Douglas	2009,	123).	However,	if	we	accept	the	standard	distinction	between	trust	and	reliance	(Baier	1986)	then	trust	can	be	betrayed	and	reliance	only	disappointed.	So	if	we	want	to	talk	about	the	objectivity	of	for	instance	a	method,	we	should	talk	about	reliance,	not	trust,	as	a	method	cannot	betray	us.	To	clarify	what	this	reliance	is	based	on,	let	us	turn	again	to	negative	accounts	of	objectivity.	As	noted,	Daston	and	Galison	(2007)	argue	that	at	least	historically,	emerging	new	senses	of	objectivity	have	been	related	to	newly	recognised	threats	arising	from	our	subjectivity.	However,	subjectivity	does	not	quite	capture	all	the	things	we	should	avoid	in	order	to	increase	the	objectivity	of	our	work.	Cognitive	biases	and	collective	biases	are	not	particularly	subjective,	but	they	do	threaten	scientific	objectivity.	So	instead	of	talking	about	subjectivity,	I	use	the	notion	of	epistemic	risks.	Biddle	and	Kukla	(2017,	218)	define	them	very	broadly	as	"risk	of	epistemic	error	that	arises	anywhere	during	knowledge	practices".	Objectivity	is	related	to	the	avoidance	of	a	specific	subset	of	epistemic	risks.	We	start	to	talk	about	objectivity	when	we	face	persistent	epistemic	risks	that	arise	from	our	failings.	The	risks	of	subjectivity,	idiosyncrasies,	cognitive	biases,	collective	biases	etc.	are	important	epistemic	risks	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents.	It	must	be	noted	that	the	risk	account	itself	is	not	normative	in	the	sense	that	it	would	tell	us	whether	some	X	can	be	deemed	objective.	This	is	because	it	does	no	specify	what	risks	of	epistemic	error	should	be	seen	as	important	or	why,	nor	does	it	describe	the	strategies	that	are	or	should	be	used	to	mitigate	or	avert	the	risk,	nor	does	it	argue	why	they	are	effective.	However,	the	risk	account	clarifies	why	the	applicable,	often	context	sensitive	senses	of	objectivity	have	normative	force:	it	is	because	they	do	all	this.	They	all	claim	that	some	
 1	In	(Koskinen	2018)	I	only	talk	about	averting	risks.	I	now	believe	that	in	many	cases,	though	not	always,	the	verb	"mitigate"	is	more	apposite. 
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important	epistemic	risk	(or	several)	has	to	be	averted	or	mitigated,	and/or	that	a	specific	strategy	is	efficient	when	trying	to	do	so.	The	word	"important"	is	important,	as	it	clarifies	why	we	do	not	usually	talk	about	objectivity	when	facing	mundane	epistemic	risks	such	as	simple	reasoning	errors	or	easily	redeemable	ignorance.	It	also	explains	many	disagreements	about	objectivity.	Researchers	can	differ	in	their	assessments	of	the	most	important	epistemic	risks	they	face	in	some	context.	After	all,	such	assessments	are	based	on	epistemic	and	at	times	also	non-epistemic	values,	and	researchers	can	have	divergent	views	of	their	relative	importance	(Kuhn	1977;	Douglas	2000;	Wylie	2003).	Moreover,	researchers	can	also	disagree	about	the	efficacy	of	some	suggested	mitigation	strategy.	The	risks	account	meets	the	four	desiderata	mentioned	in	section	2.	Firstly,	it	does	not	refer	to	the	ontological	aspect	of	objectivity.	Secondly,	it	is	thoroughly	fallibilistic,	and	allows	the	applicable	senses	it	covers	to	be	equally	fallibilistic.	Objectivity	does	not	entail	certainty,	as	our	strategies	for	mitigating	risks	may	fail,	there	may	be	risks	we	have	not	identified	or	risks	against	which	the	chosen	strategy	is	ineffective	–	or	something	completely	unrelated	to	objectivity	may	skew	the	results.	Thirdly,	the	risk	account	makes	scientific	objectivity	a	degree	notion.	One	or	more	epistemic	risks	can	be	mitigated	or	averted,	or	a	strategy	used	for	mitigating	risks	can	be	more	or	less	effective.	So	it	makes	sense	to	say	that	we	can	reduce	or	aggravate	a	risk.	And	fourthly,	the	risk	account	clarifies	why	in	different	contexts,	different	applicable	senses	of	objectivity	are	relevant.	Many	different	kinds	of	epistemic	risks	arise	from	our	various	failings	as	epistemic	agents.	What	is	an	important	risk	depends	on	the	context,	as	different	risks	are	particularly	pressing	in	different	contexts.	Moreover,	the	risk	account	also	separates	epistemic	risks	from	the	strategies	developed	for	mitigating	them.	As	I	will	soon	argue,	many	strategies	are	applicable	only	in	some	contexts,	so	different	strategies	are	needed	in	different	contexts.		The	risk	account	makes	strategies	for	averting	or	mitigating	epistemic	risks	a	central	part	of	objectivity.	And	for	the	rest	of	this	paper	I	will	be	focusing	on	one	such	strategy.	One	that	seems	to	work	in	some	contexts	in	the	humanities	and	in	the	qualitative	social	sciences	–	but	only	some.		
5.	The	idea	of	collective	bias	In	philosophical	discussions	about	objectivity,	the	focus	is	typically	on	risks	that	are	important	and	strategies	that	are	efficient	in	the	natural	sciences.	This	is	the	case,	for	instance,	in	what	Douglas	calls	procedural	objectivity:	strategies	that	ensure	that	researcher	can	be	changed	without	changing	the	results.	It	is	easy	to	see	that	in	procedural	objectivity	the	focus	is	on	the	epistemic	risks	arising	from	the	imperfections	of	individual	epistemic	agents.	As	Daston	and	Galison	have	noted,	such	risks	have	for	a	long	time	been	seen	as	central	in	the	natural	sciences.	Thus	for	instance	experimental	methods	are	generally	designed	so	as	to	ensure	procedural	objectivity	as	far	as	possible.		When	talking	about	objectivity	in	the	humanities	and	in	the	qualitative	social	sciences	we	must	focus	both	on	strategies	that	can	actually	be	used	in	these	contexts,	and	on	epistemic	
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risks	that	are	deemed	particularly	pressing	in	them.	It	is	easy	to	see	that	in	historiography	or	anthropology	the	use	of	experimental	methods	is	possible	only	to	a	very	limited	degree.	And	devising	other	ways	to	ensure	procedural	objectivity	may	sometimes	be	impracticable.	Changing	an	ethnographer	in	the	middle	of	her	fieldwork	is	not	as	simple	as	changing	a	scientist	working	in	a	laboratory.	So	the	mitigation	of	the	epistemic	risks	arising	from	the	imperfections	of	individual	researchers	as	epistemic	agents	has	to	be	ensured	in	some	other	way	–	for	instance,	through	critical	peer	discussions	and	debates.	But	these	are	not	the	only	risks	that	are	deemed	particularly	important	in	the	humanities	and	in	the	qualitative	social	sciences.	Not	only	individual,	but	also	collective	biases	are	taken	very	seriously	in	these	fields.	To	clarify	the	idea	of	collective	bias,	let	us	start	by	turning	to	the	natural	sciences	and	examining	an	example	described	by	Donna	Haraway	(1989).	According	to	her,	the	study	of	primates	in	the	US	in	the	first	half	of	the	20th	century	was	androcentric	and	sexist:	all	researchers	shared	similar	ideas	about	human	men	and	women,	and	this	led	to	research	based	on	male-dominance	schemas.	In	such	a	situation	it	is	fully	possible	that	no	one	belonging	to	the	research	community	realises	the	epistemic	risks	that	the	collective	bias	creates.	If	the	research	questions	and	methods	used	in	an	entire	field	are	based	on	the	same	biased	background	assumptions,	the	overall	picture	drawn	from	the	knowledge	produced	becomes	skewed.	For	instance,	Haraway	argues	that	in	primatology	the	sexist	assumptions	led	to	a	situation	where	the	many	roles	females	play	in	primate	groups	were	largely	ignored.	The	overall	picture	of	primate	life	and	primate	groups,	based	on	the	produced	knowledge,	was	therefore	misleading.	Strategies	that	are	effective	against	individual	biases	are	easily	ineffective	against	collective	ones.	For	example,	strategies	that	ensure	that	a	researcher	can	be	changed	without	changing	the	results	do	not	help:	if	virtually	all	researchers	in	a	research	community	share	the	same	biased	background	assumptions,	changing	the	researcher	and	getting	the	same	results	does	not	prove	the	absence	of	bias.	For	instance,	the	research	conducted	in	primatology	in	the	1950s	was	probably	fairly	objective	in	the	procedural	sense.	This	would	not	stop	the	collective	bias	from	skewing	the	scientific	understanding	of	primates	and	their	behaviour.	According	to	Haraway,	only	after	feminist	women	entered	the	field	did	the	situation	change,	as	they	also	started	to	study	the	females.	Let	us	now	return	to	the	humanities	and	the	qualitative	social	sciences.	In	the	1950s	–	when	primatology,	according	to	Haraway,	was	still	ridden	with	sexist	bias	–	ethnographers,	as	well	as	historians,	for	instance,	were	already	acutely	aware	of	epistemic	risks	caused	by	collective	biases.	My	focus	here	is	on	three	fields	where	collective	bias	is	perceived	as	a	serious	threat:	anthropology,	the	history	of	science,	and	the	sociology	of	scientific	knowledge.	In	all	three	fields	other	peoples'	ideas,	thoughts	and	beliefs	form	an	important	part	of	the	object	of	study.	A	collective	bias	can	distort	such	study	if	all	or	most	researchers	in	the	field	would	agree,	were	they	asked	to	assess	whether	the	studied	ideas	and	beliefs	are	convincing	or	plausible.	To	better	understand	why	this	is	so,	let	us	briefly	look	at	each	of	the	three	fields.	In	anthropology,	ethnocentrism	has	for	a	century	now	been	treated	as	something	that	seriously	jeopardises	the	epistemic	quality	of	research	and	must	be	avoided.	Ethnocentric	ethnography	is	based	on	the	idea	that	the	researcher's	own	culture	is	better	than	other	
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cultures.	Other	cultures	are	seen	as	less	developed,	and	should	be	assessed	using	standards	of	the	researcher's	culture.	While	for	the	nineteenth-century	evolutionary	anthropologists	such	beliefs	were	an	important	part	of	their	theoretical	commitments,	their	critics	saw	ethnocentrism	as	a	serious	collective	bias	to	be	avoided	(Westermarck	1932;	Benedict	1934;	Boas	1940).	If	ethnographers	base	their	interpretations	on	the	assumption	that	their	own	beliefs	are	superior	to	those	of	their	informants,	they	risk	failing	in	their	central	attempt	to	understand	what	the	informants	actually	believe.	This	is	because	such	beliefs	are	properly	understood	only	in	their	context.	If	an	anthropologist	compares	a	claim	an	informant	makes	too	hastily	to	her	own	beliefs,	and	assesses	it	accordingly,	the	comparison	and	assessment	can	distort	the	often	difficult	task	of	interpreting	the	claim.	The	belief	in	the	superiority	of	one's	own	beliefs	would	be	a	poor	starting	point	in	the	task	of	interpreting	the	famous	Bororo	claim	'my	brother	is	a	parrot'	(Crocker	1977),	for	example.	Whig	historiography	also	used	to	be	conducted	more	or	less	intentionally:	historians	based	their	work	on	the	idea	that	the	present	is	better	than	past,	and	that	the	past	constitutes	the	progressive	lead-up	to	the	present.	But	already	in	the	first	half	of	the	20th	century	such	views	were	harshly	criticised:	Whiggish	assumptions	were	identified	as	biases	that	distort	research	(Butterfield	1931;	Koyré	1939).	In	the	history	of	science,	criticisms	of	Whiggism,	often	understood	as	synonymous	to	"presentism"	or	"triumphalism",	arose	during	the	latter	half	of	the	20th	century,	and	were	already	commonplace	by	the	1970s.	Historians	of	science	argued	that	a	Whiggish	tendency	to	judge	past	science	according	to	its	contribution	to	scientific	views	that	are	held	true	today	distorts	research	and	leads	to	teleological	narratives	of	scientific	progress.	(Jardine	2003;	Alvargonzales	2013.)	A	similar	development	took	place	in	the	sociology	of	scientific	knowledge.	Particularly	the	scholars	who	formed	the	Edinburgh	school	argued	that	when	studying	scientific	knowledge	production,	sociologists	should	avoid	explaining	the	success	of	theories	that	are	accepted	today	differently	than	the	former	success	of	theories	that	have	eventually	been	refuted.	They	took	such	asymmetrical	treatment	to	be	seriously	biased.	The	current	status	of	a	theory	in	the	eyes	of	the	scientific	community	should	not	determine	the	way	in	which	a	sociologist	starts	to	study	its	formation.	(Bloor	1976;	Barnes,	Bloor	and	Henry	1996.)	In	all	three	cases,	the	identified	bias	is	of	a	collective	nature:	the	critics	argue	that	their	predecessors	did	not	fully	grasp	the	adverse	consequences	of	their	ideas:	ethnocentrism,	Whiggism	and	asymmetrical	explanations	distort	research,	as	important	aspects	of	the	results	are	fixed	beforehand	in	an	epistemically	unjustified	way.	Moreover,	the	critics	saw	these	biases	as	something	whole	research	communities	are	prone	to	succumb	to.	As	long	as	all	ethnographers	share	a	similar	social	and	cultural	background	and	a	similar	education,	it	is	all	too	easy	to	draw	on	that	background	and	education	when	assessing	ideas	developed	in	other	cultures.	In	the	history	of	science	and	the	sociology	of	scientific	knowledge,	the	risk	is	even	more	obvious:	all	researchers	who	are	alive	at	the	same	time	share	similar	ideas	about	which	scientific	theories	are	likely	to	be	reliable	and	which	have	been	rejected	for	good	reasons.	Unless	this	is	actively	avoided,	it	is	natural	to	explain	the	success	of	the	accepted	theories	by	saying	that	they	were	the	correct	ones,	and	to	either	say	little	about	the	success	of	eventually	refuted	theories,	or	to	offer	social	explanations.	In	other	words,	these	three	quite	similar	
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collective	biases	were	in	their	respective	fields	identified	as	important	epistemic	risks	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents.		
6.	Withholding	epistemic	judgement	as	a	strategy	for	mitigating	collective	bias	Not	only	was	the	risk	identified,	but	by	mid-century	ethnographers	already	had	a	well-established	strategy	for	mitigating	collective	bias:	withholding	epistemic	judgement.2	During	the	latter	part	of	the	century,	the	same	strategy	would	also	be	adopted	by	historians	of	science	and	sociologists	of	scientific	knowledge.		The	rationale	of	this	strategy	is	simple:	you	will	not	–	even	inadvertently	–	assess	the	informants'	beliefs	or	the	work	of	early	or	current	scientists	by	the	standards	of	judgement	ingrained	into	you	through	culture	and	education,	if	you	altogether	avoid	judging	these	epistemically.		In	ethnography	the	strategy	translates	into	practices	where	the	knowledge	claims	made	by	informants	are	treated	in	a	very	different	way	than	those	of	one's	colleagues.	When	encountering	the	first	kind	of	claim,	an	ethnographer	is	supposed	to	attempt	to	interpret	it	–	only	the	latter	kind	of	claim	may	be	criticised.	Evaluative	comparisons	between	knowledge	systems	or	belief	systems	are	avoided.	Informants'	cosmological	views,	or	their	stories	about	the	origin	of	humankind,	are	not	something	an	ethnographer	would	compare	to	the	current	scientific	understanding	of	the	structure	of	the	universe	or	human	evolution.	Thus,	for	instance,	the	claim	that	in	the	autumn	birds	fly	to	lintukoto	("the	home	of	the	birds"),	which	they	reach	by	slipping	under	the	edge	of	the	sky,	is	not	something	an	ethnographer	doing	fieldwork	in	Siberia	would	attempt	to	criticise	(Siikala	2002;	Koskinen	2011).	Such	suspension	of	judgement	and	censure	is	quite	generally	seen	as	"co-terminous	with	good	anthropology"	(Jarvie	2006,	582).	Critical	debates	occur	between	colleagues	who	"speak	the	same	language,	belong	to	the	same	academic	profession,	live	in	the	same	society"	(Asad	1986,	156),	and	who	therefore	understand	each	other	and	often	share	more	or	less	the	same	standards	of	epistemic	judgement	–	all	of	which	makes	it	possible	for	them	to	engage	in	a	meaningful	debate.	In	the	history	of	science	and	in	the	sociology	of	scientific	knowledge	the	strategy	of	withholding	epistemic	judgement,	typically	called	neutrality	or	impartiality,	takes	a	slightly	different	form	than	in	anthropology.	This	is	because	in	these	fields	some	of	the	ideas	studied	tend	to	sound	more	plausible	to	the	researchers	than	others,	and	the	perceived	epistemic	risks	ensue	from	this	asymmetry.	As	David	Bloor	(1981)	argued	in	a	debate	with	Larry	Laudan,	if	researchers	let	the	future	success	of	a	theory	direct	the	way	in	which	the	development	of	that	theory	is	studied,	they	risk	missing	important	parts	of	the	processes	they	study.	The	correctness	of	a	theory	does	not	always	explain	its	success.	For	example,	when	
 2	In	anthropology	the	strategy	would	sometimes	take	the	form	of	withholding	not	only	epistemic,	but	also	moral	judgement:	if	the	study	of	the	moral	codes	accepted	in	different	cultures	can	be	distorted	by	judgements	based	on	the	ethnographer's	own	moral	views,	such	judgements	should	be	avoided.	This	methodological	principle	has	often	been	mixed	with	forms	of	moral	relativism,	which	in	turn	has	been	heavily	debated	in	anthropology	(see	e.g.	Goodale	2006).	However,	I	will	here	focus	on	the	withholding	of	epistemic	judgement,	as	it	is	a	strategy	used	in	all	three	fields	I	examine	here. 
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Louis	Pasteur	questioned	Félix-Archimède	Pouchet's	views	about	the	possibility	of	spontaneous	generation	of	life	from	non-living	materials,	Pasteur	eventually	triumphed	–	but	not	because	he	was	right.	Bloor	cites	Farley	and	Geison's	(1974)	account	of	the	clash,	where	the	authors	convincingly	show	that	Pasteur's	victory	was	largely	due	to	political	and	religious	reasons.	So,	argues	Bloor	(1981,	200–201),	a	"comprehensive	rather	than	an	arbitrarily	truncated	picture	of	science"	must	be	based	on	research	that	treats	all	beliefs	alike.	One	of	the	key	components	of	the	strong	programme	in	the	sociology	of	scientific	knowledge,	impartiality,	translates	into	the	practice	of	withholding	epistemic	judgement	on	the	scientific	knowledge	claims	the	sociologist	is	studying:	one	should	remain	"impartial	with	respect	to	truth	and	falsity,	rationality	or	irrationality,	success	or	failure"	(Bloor	1976,	7).	Harry	Collins	has	emphasised	the	methodological	nature	of	this	norm.	If	the	aim	is	to	investigate	the	part	scientists	have	played	in	the	construction	of	scientific	knowledge,	"it	is	no	use	using	the	outcome	of	the	process	as	a	part	of	the	explanation	of	the	outcome"	(Collins	1981,	222).	The	best	way	to	avoid	doing	so	is	to	deliberately	bracket	one's	"scientific	instinct"	or	"pre-analytic	intuitions"	(ibid.).	As	Collins	emphasised,	this	is	far	from	easy;	one	can	fail,	in	many	subtle	ways,	to	withhold	epistemic	judgement.	Nevertheless,	it	is	clear	that	he	held	the	attempt	to	be	a	fairly	effective	strategy	for	mitigating	collective	bias.		
7.	Limits	of	the	strategy	Withholding	epistemic	judgement	may	be	an	effective	strategy	for	mitigating	collective	bias.	However,	this	is	true	only	in	some	contexts.	For	instance,	the	strategy	would	not	have	helped	the	primatologists	in	the	1950s,	as	it	is	applicable	only	in	contexts	where	other	people's	ideas	are	a	central	part	of	the	object	of	study.	This	is	not	the	case	in	primatology,	so	the	strategy	would	not	have	been	usable:	primatologists	do	not	study	anything	with	regards	to	which	they	could	withhold	their	epistemic	judgement.	As	already	noted,	using	experimental	methods	that	satisfy	(or	are	supposed	to	satisfy)	the	requirements	of	procedural	objectivity	is	often	not	a	usable	strategy	for	mitigating	individual	biases	and	idiosyncracies	in	humanities	research.	Similarly,	withholding	epistemic	judgement	is	an	unusable	strategy	in	the	natural	sciences.	But	the	contexts	where	the	strategy	is	usable	are	limited	not	only	by	the	nature	of	the	object	of	study,	but	also	by	the	distance	between	the	researchers	and	their	ideas,	and	the	people	and	ideas	being	studied.	When	the	distance	diminishes	or	is	not	significant	enough,	researchers	using	this	strategy	encounter	at	least	two	clear	problems.	Firstly,	if	the	necessary	distance	disappears	(or	if	the	necessary	distance	has	always	been	missing),	the	strategy	becomes	unusable,	as	it	becomes	inadmissible	or	practically	impossible	to	actually	withhold	epistemic	judgement.	Secondly,	the	people	whose	ideas	are	being	studied	can	protest	against	the	strategy.	Let	us	look	at	both	problems	in	more	detail.	Hasok	Chang	(2009)	has	recently	argued	that	though	full	neutrality	is	often	assumed	to	be	the	only	way	to	avoid	Whiggism,	it	has	never	really	been	a	suitable	strategy	in	the	history	of	science.	Current	science	is	linked	to	past	science	in	many	ways	that	quite	unavoidably	affect	the	historian's	problem-choices.	So	when	historians	choose	their	research	questions,	they	cannot	help	assessing	what	aspects	of	past	science	are	worthy	of	study.	Chang	(2009,	253)	
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therefore	argues	that	in	the	history	of	science,	neutrality	is	"in	fact	a	judgmental	stance	disguised	as	non-judgement".	In	anthropology	withholding	epistemic	judgement	has	been	a	usable	strategy,	but	only	as	long	as	ethnographers	have	worked	among	communities	that	have	little	contact	with	Western,	academic	thought.	In	contemporary	anthropology,	there	are	researchers	who	prefer	not	to	work	with	informants,	but	rather	have	members	of	the	studied	communities	become	co-researchers	in	participatory	projects.	Moreover,	activist	researchers	belonging	to	Indigenous	communities	participate	in	anthropological	conferences.	In	such	situations	withholding	epistemic	judgement	is	no	longer	a	suitable	strategy.	Avoiding	the	epistemic	appraisal	of	the	knowledge	claims	made	by	a	member	of	one's	research	team	is	hardly	an	epistemically	advisable	practice.	And	it	would	be	both	epistemically	and	ethically	questionable	to	deny	critical	comments	from	Indigenous	activist	researchers	(Koskinen	2014).	The	people	whose	knowledge	is	being	studied	can	also	protest	against	the	strategy	of	withholding	epistemic	judgement.	For	instance,	they	can	interpret	it	as	a	sign	of	mistrust	or	disparagement	–	as	a	statement	that	their	knowledge	claims	are	not	worthy	of	epistemic	appraisal.	Indigenous	activist	researchers	have	criticised	earlier	anthropology	and	demanded	that	Indigenous	thought	and	Indigenous	philosophies	or	epistemologies	should	be	approached	not	"simply	as	interesting	objects	of	study	(claims	that	some	believe	to	be	true)	but	as	intellectual	orientations	that	map	out	ways	of	discovering	things	about	the	world"	(Garroutte	2003,	10).	In	a	surprisingly	similar	way	scientists	encountering	the	work	of	sociologists	subscribing	to	the	ideas	of	the	strong	programme	have	sometimes	disapproved	quite	vehemently.	While	the	so-called	science	wars	certainly	did	not	reduce	to	misunderstandings	or	disagreements	about	the	aims	and	methods	of	the	sociology	of	scientific	knowledge,	the	strategy	of	withholding	epistemic	judgement	can	be	seen	as	one	of	the	bones	of	contention	in	said	disputes.	Some	scientists	either	did	not	understand	the	methodological	nature	of	the	sociologists'	impartiality,	or	they	found	it	otherwise	unacceptable,	and	potentially	harmful,	as	they	feared	it	might	jeopardise	public	trust	in	science	(Hacking	1999;	Labinger	&	Collins	2001).	But	we	must	remember	that	the	strategy	of	withholding	epistemic	judgement	has	served	a	purpose:	it	is	a	strategy	adopted	in	order	to	mitigate	a	specific	epistemic	risk	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents:	collective	bias.	If	the	strategy	is	abandoned,	the	epistemic	risk	must	be	mitigated	in	some	other	way.	And,	naturally,	other	strategies	are	being	suggested	and	developed.	For	historians	of	science,	Chang	(2009,	254)	offers	a	strategy	which	he	calls	independent	judgmentalism:	"the	historian	is	a	free	agent,	despite	her/his	obvious	rootedness	in	present	society	and	science	[…]	We	historians	need	to	face	up	the	implications	and	consequences	of	the	judgements	we	do	and	must	make.	I	am	much	happier	to	accept	that	burden	of	responsibility,	than	to	hide	beneath	a	murky	notion	of	neutrality."	In	anthropology	and	fields	close	to	it,	researchers	collaborating	with	Indigenous	communities,	for	instance,	are	developing	negotiation	techniques	in	order	to	find	out	shared	ideas	and	to	build	on	them.	George	Nicholas	and	Alison	Wylie	(2012;	see	also	Tully	1995)	note	that	the	starting	point	of	such	negotiations	has	to	be	the	recognition	of	differences,	rather	than	an	assumption	of	some	underlying,	universal	framework.	They	focus	on	value	differences,	but	such	negotiation	
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techniques	can	also	prove	epistemically	useful,	if	they	offer	a	way	to	avoid	ethnocentrism	without	avoiding	epistemic	judgement.		
8.	Conclusions	Withholding	epistemic	judgement	can	be	an	effective	strategy	for	mitigating	collective	bias,	but	it	is	needed	only	in	some	contexts,	and	is	a	usable	strategy	only	in	some	contexts.	The	same	applies	to	many	strategies	used	in	order	to	increase	the	objectivity	of	science:	they	are	efficient	against	some	epistemic	risks,	not	all,	and	they	are	usable	in	some	contexts,	not	all.	Withholding	epistemic	judgement	appears	as	a	possibly	useful	strategy	only	in	contexts	where	certain	kinds	of	collective	biases	–	such	as	ethnocentrism	or	Whiggism	–	are	deemed	important.	There	it	helps	the	researcher	to	avoid	the	bias.	But	it	is	a	usable	strategy	probably	only	when	the	distance	between	the	researchers	and	their	ideas,	and	the	people	and	ideas	being	studied,	is	significant	enough.		The	risk	account	of	scientific	objectivity	allows	this	kind	of	an	analysis.	It	clarifies	why	withholding	epistemic	judgement	can	be	seen	as	a	strategy	that	increases	the	objectivity	of	research,	and	it	is	useful	when	defining	the	limitations	of	the	strategy.	Moreover,	by	drawing	attention	both	to	the	variety	of	epistemic	risks	that	induce	us	to	talk	about	objectivity,	and	to	the	variety	of	risk	mitigation	strategies,	it	clarifies	why	objectivity	is	such	a	contextual	matter.	If	we	wish	to	pay	more	attention	to	objectivity	in	social	research,	or	in	the	humanities	and	the	qualitative	social	sciences,	understanding	the	contextual	nature	of	scientific	objectivity	is	crucial.	The	epistemic	risks	arising	from	our	imperfections	as	epistemic	agents	that	are	deemed	particularly	important	in	these	fields	are	not	necessarily	the	same	risks	that	are	emphasised	in	the	natural	sciences.	Moreover,	the	risk	mitigation	strategies	used	do	not	look	the	same	at	all.	If	this	is	not	recognised,	many	strategies	that	arguably	increase	the	objectivity	of	research	in	the	humanities	and	the	social	sciences	can	go	unnoticed	by	philosophers	interested	in	objectivity.	This	would	be	a	shame,	as	it	could	lead	to	misleadingly	harsh	assessments	of	the	objectivity	of	research	and	its	results	in	these	fields.			
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